While there is growing research on online politics in China some political uses of the Internet have tended to be overlooked. The focus of this article is on an emerging phenomenon in Chinese cyberspace, the human flesh search engine (HFSE), a term first used by the Chinese media to refer to the practice of online searching for people or 'human hunting'. While existing examinations have focused on breaches of individual privacy by these so-called online 'vigilantes' this study focuses on the ability of HFSE to reveal norm transgressions by public officials and lead to their removal. In order to give readers a comprehensive overview of what an HFSE is, the first section of this article provides basic information about it. In the second part, 20 well-documented HFSE examples are listed to show their varying aims and then HFSEs which focus on local governments and officials are shown to highlight the political dimensions of HFSE. In the third section, four case studies of government/official-focused HFSE are explored in detail to show political HFSEs' internal processes and underlying mechanisms.
Introduction
The term human flesh search engine (HFSE) might be more at home in pages of a horror novel but was originally applied by the Chinese media to refer to the practice of online searching for people or 'human hunting'. The term shot to prominence outside China when the non-Chinese media covered the story of Wang Fei, a Beijing man who was vilified by online mobs after his wife committed suicide, allegedly due to his infidelity (Fletcher, 2008) . In the UK, a headline in The Guardian on this incident noted: 'Chinese online vigilantes hunt human flesh'; it continued 'Forget the FBI or Jack Bauer, no one tracks down a miscreant as fast as Chinese vigilantes' (Branigan, 2008a ; see also Downey, 2010 , Ransom, 2008 . Another article from The Times Online noted: 'Human Flesh Search Engine: Chinese vigilantes that hunt victims on the web' (Fletcher, 2008) . The story of online vigilantes hunting down an individual, identifying him, where he lived, and encouraging public condemnation of his behaviour also appeared in the New York Times, which observed that HFSE was a form of online vigilante justice where Internet users hunt down and punish people who have attracted their wrath. The goal is to get the targets of a search fired from their jobs, shamed in front of their neighbours, run out of town. It is crowd-sourced detective work, pursued online -with offline results. (Downey, 2010) Examples like this are of course not restricted to China. Solove starts his book The Future of Reputation with the example of a Korean girl who was subject to the opprobrium of Internet users after pictures of her refusing to clean up her dog's faeces on a subway train emerged online.
Within hours, she was labeled as dog shit girl and her pictures and parodies were anywhere. Within days, her identity and her past were revealed. Requests for information about her parents and relatives started popping up and people started to recognize her by the dog and the bag she was carrying as well as her watch, clearly visible in the original picture. All mentions of privacy invasion were shouted down … . The common excuse for their behavior was that the girl doesn't deserve privacy. (Solove, 2007, p. 1) As a result of embarrassment and pressure caused by the shaming and criticizing, the 'dog shit girl' dropped out of her university (see also Shirkey, 2008) .
In the Chinese context there is a concern that this represents a new kind of online collective action that is disturbing. Domestic media, such as the official news agency Xinhua in one article, likened HFSE to Internet lynching (Bai & Ji, 2008) ; it noted:
The 'human flesh search engine' is not the familiar search engine from Baidu and Google, but the idea of a search engine employing thousands of individuals all mobilized with one aim, to dig out facts and expose them to the baleful glare of publicity.
This article argued that the 'Internet gave people a disguise, enabling the exercise of power without responsibility.' It also cited the example of the Wang Fei case in which after his personal details were exposed on the Internet, Wang Fei was harassed by people who wrote graffiti on the door of his parent's house accusing them of killing Wang's wife, and who phoned his boss asking him to lay off Wang. This incident both in China and abroad was framed in terms of vigilantes and invasion of personal privacy; indeed, Wang sued the Tianya and Daqi (two major online communities in China) for initially allowing circulation of his personal details and infringing his privacy and damaging his reputation. This, however, is not the only case of HFSE and concerns about personal privacy and harassment by online mobs overlook an important political dimension of HFSEs, which is to set their sights on misbehaviour by public officials.
In December 2008, a Chinese citizen anonymously posted the travel expense claims of government officials accidentally found on a subway train in Shanghai. The documents showed that a group of officials from two local governments had taken lavish 'study tours' to the United States and Canada where they spent public money on visiting major tourist attractions. After these documents surfaced, details of these officials were exposed by other Internet users who knew the officials whose names were shown in the documents. Chinese Internet users discussed the alleged corruption in online forums and organized online petition asking the two local governments concerned to penalize their officials. Under public pressure, the two local governments dismissed the exposed officials and a series of inquiries were launched to ensure best practice in the relevant departments (Canaves, 2008) .
Here we have an example where HFSE revealed a transgression of the rules, creating pressure on government which led to the removal of public officials for corrupt practices. In other words, there might well have been a breach of individual privacy by these so-called vigilantes but the result was that corrupt public officials were held to account. Official corruption is one of the gravest challenges in contemporary China and public officials have been the main perpetrators of corruption in China for the past 20 years (Guo, 2008a) . According to the data shown on the website of the Ministry of Supervision of The People's Republic of China, in 30 years from 1982 to 2011, there were about 4.2 million officials who have received different forms of punishment for corrupt practices (e.g. dismissal, inter-party warning, expulsion, jail sentence). According to Koblitz and Zimmerman (2012) , in 2011, 142,893 officials were punished for corruption and disciplinary violations, far exceeding the number of 106,626 in 2009. There may still be countless uncovered cases which are beyond the attention and capability of central government that has been making efforts to regulate and supervise its bureaucratic system. In the light of corruption as being a serious problem in China, it is important to examine the way HFSEs are being used to hold political officials and local governments to account. Based on a systematic gathering exercise the next section examines 20 incidents of HFSE to establish the extent to which the above political example is a prominent focus for HFSE.
The different types of HFSE
As identified HFSE is more than merely the online bullying of individuals by online vigilantes, it can also take on a political dimension. However, there is no readily available database classifying the different types of HFSE. How many are focused on office holders and how many on members of the public? This section examines 20 well-documented cases of HFSE (between 2001 and 2011) to establish for the first time how many cases have been focused on wrongdoing by public officials. While the issues addressed by HFSE vary widely it can be defined as follows: a group of Internet users working together (in a variety of ways), using their contacts (on and off the Internet) and conventional search engines to achieve a common goal (broadly defined). Often triggered in response to wrongdoing or transgression of generally accepted norms (but not exclusively so) they aim to dig out information and expose it to the public, in order to obtain some form of redress. HFSE involves the pattern of crowdsourcing, which means separately designated tasks in any job are outsourced to an undefined, generally large group of people in the form of an open call (Howe, 2006) . HFSE is based on the participation of geographically dispersed Internet users who respond to a series of calls publicized in an online forum. Table 1 shows basic information of 20 cases of HFSE, which have been identified via systematic searching. The search for possible cases started with an Internet search. Google was the most frequently used Internet search engine to look for foreign material on HFSE, and Baidu, a Chinese search engine, was used to look for relevant Chinese materials. The main keywords for using searching engines are 'Human Flesh Search Engine' in English and '人肉搜索' in Chinese. The Nexis database was also used to look for English coverage on HFSE. The Internet searching revealed a wide range of possible cases each of which needed to be checked. Denzin (1978, pp. 294-307) extends the idea of triangulation beyond its conventional association with research methods and designs by distinguishing four forms of triangulation: data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theoretical triangulation, and methodological triangulation. In this research, data triangulation is employed, which entails gathering information of each single case from multiple sources. The details of each case presented later are mainly based on numerous news articles published in Chinese and English. Information from multiple sources may overlap, but this enables a robust database and confirmation of events. There is also a process of condensing and packaging all the available information to make it fit the story-telling format of each case and better display its internal process.
Empirically, there are more than 20 examples, but only those listed here have been carefully triangulated (Denzin, 1978) . These are the ones that have been corroborated through multiple Tracking down a woman with her online nickname ju hua xiang xiang allegedly having an affair with a government officer (Wu, 2008 Fact-checking police's announcement about a young woman Deng Yujiao sentenced to jail for her having stabbed a local official to death (Herold, 2011) sources. Among the cases listed above, there are 12 non-government/official-focused HFSEs and 8 government/official-focused ones. The former have aims varying from tracking down immoral citizens to fact-checking the credibility of an announcement made by a member of the public, the news content of national media, or looking for a missing person; for government/official-focused ones the aims range from tracking down corrupt government officials to fact-checking government announcements. The two types of HFSE depend on web-based crowdsourcing but have a different focus: while the government/official-focused HFSE reflects how the Chinese Internet users respond to and interact with the government, the non-government/official-focused HFSE illustrates more the prevailing sociocultural norms in Chinese society stressed by Confucianism (e.g. loyalty, righteousness, kindness, and sincerity), the violation of which incurs public opprobrium.
Political dimension of HFSE
The table above identified eight cases of 'government/official-focused' HFSE. This section examines these cases in more detail. The following table provides more information about each case. Basically, the table shows there are two types of government/official-focused HFSE, differentiated according to their aims: one is punishing corrupt officials and another the fact-checking of announcements made by government or the police. For the first type, Internet users tracked down corrupt government officials in the hope of getting them punished. For the second type, Internet users search for evidence to corroborate the announcement made by government or police, and reveal if there was an underlying official deception or a cover-up. In the following section, two cases of target-punishing HFSE and two cases of fact-checking HFSE are examined, which clearly illustrate the internal processes at work in the two types of government/official-focused HFSE.
While this article is interested in successful manifestations of the HFSE phenomenon it should be noted that it does not look at cases that did not get off the ground, or at cases that did not end in the punishment or the contradiction of public officials. There are two cases which failed in this latter regard. In case 1 of Table 2 , the woman targeted by HFSE denied that she was the person in the evidence presented. The woman's claims and lack of evidence to the contrary and lack of evidence about the high-level government official she was supposedly having a relationship with seem to have been enough to create some doubt. The HFSE generated visibility of a woman's claims on a sensitive subject but could not find further evidence to substantiate the original claims either because they were bogus or the smoking gun was not attainable and so it came to an end. In the second case, Case 7 in Table 2 , it seems that the HFSE was stopped by overwhelming proof that the youngest mayor in China was not appointed due to family connections but rather his capabilities. Both types of HFSE do not necessarily end in punishment or the contradiction of public officials claims; the final stage is dependent on the information that can be uncovered by the HFSE and the response of the offline authorities.
Corrupt official jailed after his careless words leads to evidence of corruption On 10 December 2008 (Moore, 2008) , Zhou Jiugeng, the chief of the Real Estate Management Bureau in Jiangning district of Nanjin City (the capital of Jiangsu province, one of the most developed provinces in China), stated when interviewed by journalists that the Real Estate Management Bureau would closely monitor the real estate market in Jiangning and punish real estate developers who sold houses at lower-than-cost price (in some cities of China such as Jiangning, many houses could not be sold, pushing real estate developers to think about (Continued) other ways such as lowering house prices to relieve the problem of overstock). After Zhou's statement had been widely reported by the media, he became the target of Internet users who were displeased with his insensitivity to house prices that had greatly exceeded ordinary people's ability to buy a source of general grievance among the Chinese public (Wang, 2011;  (Yang, 2008) , but most of the exposure was done by Internet users. In the following days, more and more information about Zhou Jiugeng was revealed. On 12 December 2008, an Internet user bao cun 100 nian revealed in the Kaidi forum that Zhou smoked luxury brand cigarettes worth 1500 Yuan (roughly USD 238) a pack (Zhu, 2008) . This Internet user uploaded pictures of Zhou attending a government meeting with a pack of luxury brand cigarettes on the table beside him and commented that a government official on a normal salary could not afford the most expensive brand cigarettes in Nanjing. On 15 December, an Internet user Cheyou007 published a post titled 'Zhou Jiugeng smokes luxury cigarettes and wears an expensive watch.' Chenyou007 found some old newspaper pictures which showed Zhou wearing a Vacheron Constantin watch worth 100,000 Yuan (roughly USD 15,891). The following day, an Internet user Guo Xinpeng sent an email to the governor of Jiangning District, reporting Zhou Jiugeng's misbehaviour and requesting a thorough inquiry into him (Zeng, 2009 ).
On 17th December, an Internet user wei da de ren min revealed that Zhou's brother was a real estate developer and stressed that Zhou's remark on the real estate market was relevant to his brother and intended to protect his family's interests. It was then shown that Zhou's son was the owner of a construction company (Cui & Xiao, 2009 ). On 20 December, 10 days after Zhou's remark was broadcast, the government of Jiangning District first responded to the online uproar by announcing that they had started an inquiry into Zhou Jiugeng. On 28 December 2008, Zhou was dismissed due to his inappropriate remarks and for misusing public funds to buy luxury goods. As the investigation got more detailed, more evidence of Zhou's corruption surfaced. According to the investigation result, from 2003 to 2008, Zhou had accepted more than 1 million Yuan (roughly USD 158,916) from others. On 10 October 2009, Zhou was sentenced to 11 years in jail for corruption (Wang & Cai, 2009 ).
Zhou would not have been punished if public attention had focused only on his inappropriate remark; however, it was Internet users angered at his remark, and searching for and finding photos of him, which raised suspicions of corruption. The photographs generated public opprobrium about corruption and led Internet users to work together to find more photographic evidence. The example illustrates the way HFSE is used to hold often unaccountable corrupt officials to account. As noted, official corruption is a major source of public grievance in China; however, it is often unchecked by official sources and official media (Lum, 2006) . If official channels for removing corrupt officers are not available or not effective, then unofficial channels become an important outlet. The incompetence of the political system in dealing with corruption (Pei, 2006) and the strictly censored media environment (Lagerkvist, 2005; Zhao, 2004) are handicapping official exposure of corruption and encouraging the Chinese public to look for additional outlets to gain justice.
Political officer sacked 24 hours after restaurant CCTV footage is exposed online
While the first example focuses on financial malfeasance the second concerns the abuse of power. On the evening of 29 October 2008, Lin Jiaxiang, the then party secretary and deputy directorgeneral of Shenzhen Maritime Safety Administration (in Guangdong Province), was quarrelling in a restaurant lobby with a young girl's parents who insisted that Lin had assaulted their 11-yearold daughter in the corridor leading to the men's toilet. Facing the complaining parents, Lin said: 'I did that, so what? How much money do you want? .... Do you know who I am? I am from the Ministry of Transport. I rank as high as your mayor. How dare you quarrel with me?' A camera in the restaurant lobby filmed the incident and the footage was posted anonymously the next day on an online forum Aoyi (the news portal website founded by the South News Group based in Guangdong). One hour later a journalist of the Southern Metropolitan Daily published a report entitled 'A little girl assaulted in a restaurant by a man on the way to toilet'. Until this moment, nobody had known the identity of this man.
At around 22:30 pm on the same day after the first media report concerning Lin was published, a posting emerged in the Aoyi online forum with the title 'Human Flesh Search Engine, let's track down the self-called high-level official' (Feng, 2008) . In the morning of 31 October 2008, many news websites and online forums in China reproduced this story and many mainstream media immediately followed as well (Feng, 2008) . On the same day, an Internet user osnuigj revealed the man's identity, and another Internet user provided an audio clip recording the dialogue between the man and the girl's parents in the local police station, which showed that the man wanted to pay for his misdeed but that it was refused by the girl's parents.
In the afternoon of 31 October 2008, Shenzhen Maritime Safety Administration admitted that the man in the footage was their officer Lin Jiaxiang. They announced that Lin had been suspended from his position and that a team organized by the Ministry of Transport from Beijing had arrived in Shenzhen to investigate. Many Chinese Internet users were not satisfied with this and insisted that Lin had committed child molestation but was shielded from punishment. On 5 November 2008, the Shenzhen police held a news conference to announce the result of their follow-up investigation. Lin was dismissed from his government position for his inappropriate behaviour in public. It was also announced that there was not sufficient evidence of assault as the camera in that restaurant did not cover the passage leading to the toilet, and thus was unable to show if the assault really happened or not. The case against Lin on the charge of child molestation was finally rejected. Meanwhile, persistent Internet users began searching for details of the woman shown in the video having dinner with Lin, who in the view of Chinese Internet users was probably Lin's mistress (Feng, 2008) . But she was proved later by police investigation to be just Lin's friend.
Lin Jiaxiang was finally dismissed from his job. Again we see that under pressure of the HFSE and in this case some media outlets, a public official was held to account for his activities. The media though only became involved after the initial story had emerged online and initiated the search; it would be wrong to suggest that HFSE is the sole means of holding officials to account, but in these carefully substantiated examples they can be seen as a force that can bring some accountability. The goal of these HFSEs is not just to complain but to ensure that there is some form of just outcome. The general grievance of the Chinese public about political malfeasance and the failure of government to discipline officials drives actors to look for justice. The strictly censored media environment (Lagerkvist, 2005; Zhao, 2004 ) and the poorly functioning judicial system (Ackerman, 1999; Shen, 2012) mean there are few alternative outlets. Finally, the Internet turns out to be possibly the most convenient and effective channel to enable actors to achieve their goal (there is also online censorship, but not as strict and insurmountable as censorship on conventional media). As noted, HFSE is also used in a fact-checking capacity, which is illustrated by the following two cases.
Government credibility and the fake tiger photo
On 12 October 2007, the Provincial Forestry Bureau in Shaanxi province of China publicized via a news conference two South China Tiger photos taken by Zhou Zhenglong, a hunter in Zhenpin county of Shaanxi province (Shan, 2007) . During this conference, senior officials of the Shaanxi Provincial Forestry Bureau (SPFB) announced that according to the opinion of three zoologists, these photos confirmed the existence of the wild South China Tiger in the forest of Zhenpin County (this place has historically been seen as the main habitat of wild South China Tiger). Immediately after this news conference as well as news coverage on it, the two tiger photos rapidly spread on-and offline. However, a posting published on 15 October 2007 in Tianya forum caught people's attention by its title 'South China Tiger, another faked news story?' Its author highlighted six problems with these photos. The emergence of this posting became a turning point, after which more and more questioning voices emerged. On the same day of 15 October, the news about 'the wild South China Tiger was found in Shaanxi' was reproduced by several newspapers and broadcasts, intensifying the public questioning of these tiger photos' credibility ('The South China Tiger', 2007).
On 23 October, Zhou and few officials from local government went to the National Forestry Department (NFD) in Beijing to submit these photos and, more importantly, to apply for administrative permission to construct a conservation area for the South China Tiger in Zhenpin County ('The South China Tiger ', 2007) . Commonly, it would be expected that the involvement of central government could bring a convincing conclusion about these photos' authenticity. However, what disappointed the public was that the NFD was unable to tell if these photos were real or not; what it could do, as its spokesman stressed, was to make sure that there was a real population of wild South China Tiger in Zhenpin rather than testing if these photos were real. The response from the central authorities and Zhou and local officials' insistence of the tiger photos being real fuelled Internet users' passion to look for new evidence to disprove their statements. There was a second turning point when an Internet user showed on 15 November 2007 that the original image of the tiger may have been copied from an old Chinese lunar year calendar, a screenshot of which was also uploaded (Tan, 2007) . Then, more and more Internet users joined the online investigation, discussing and analysing how these tiger photos had been faked (Guo, 2010) .
Besides the online uproar, offline investigation was also started. Civic investigation teams were organized by media organizations and professional associations. As the online uproar extended offline, the NFD finally issued a demand that the SPFB should check again carefully the credibility of the tiger photos and publicize the result as soon as possible. The case finally ended with local government's confession that these tiger photos were not real; 13 officials in the SPFB were dismissed for their irresponsibility in photo evaluation and for their holding a news conference without administrative permission; three officials of the Zhenpin County government were dismissed for faking relevant reports; hunter Zhou Zhenlong was also sentenced to 30 months in jail for the charge of faking tiger photos (Ding, 2008) .
The 'hide and seek' event This example illustrates a fact-checking HFSE that targeted an attempted cover-up of a prisoner's death in police custody. On 13 February 2009, the Yunnan.cn (the news website sponsored by the Yunnan Daily News Group in Yunnan Province) reported that Li Qiaomin, a 24-year-old man detained in prison for illegal logging, had died of a severe brain injury in hospital (Wang, 2009b) . Local police explained that Li's brain injury was due to his head hitting the wall after he was kicked by another prisoner when playing the game 'hide and seek' (Li, 2009a) .
However, the police's claim was greeted with scepticism. Many Internet users expressed their doubts over the official claim about Li's death (Li, 2009b; Wang, 2009b) . The prisoner's death then became a public hot topic and the Chinese phrase '躲猫猫' ('hide and seek') became one of the most popular online phrases in Chinese cyberspace in 2009 (Wang, 2009c) . In online forums and chat groups, there were intense discussions on the 'hide and seek' event. In the afternoon on 13 February 2009, only a few hours after the official claim was publicized, a local online forum devoted to the discussion proposed launching HFSE to uncover the truth underlying Li's death (Zhou, 2009) . Facing intensified online outrage and growing media question, on 19 February 2009, the Yunnan Provincial Propaganda Department published an announcement on its website about recruiting members of a civic investigation team dedicated to investigate Li's death (Xie, 2009b) . One day after, the civic team was established and started its investigation; in the morning of 21 February 2009, the civic team publicized its report, which however produced more questions (Dong, 2009) .
The proposal of organizing a civic investigation team by the Yunnan government was initially aimed to calm down the online uproar concerning Li's death and prevent its reputation from being questioned and damaged by public discussion. However, its failure to uncover the 'truth' raised the question of an official cover-up. The team members were labelled 'insiders' who allegedly kept the truth hidden intentionally. Thus Chinese Internet users launched HFSE to search for the real identities of the team members, who were found to be mainly journalists and webmasters and were further shamed by Internet users insisting they were 'insiders' (Zhang, 2009 ). On 24 February 2009, the website of Jinning government (the county where the prison was located) was hacked by Chinese Internet users who changed all the contents shown on its homepage into one term '躲猫猫' ('hide and seek') (Guan, 2009) . Pressured by on-and offline questioning, on 27 February 2009, the Yunnan provincial government held a news conference, announcing that instead of accepting the investigation result given by the Jinning County Public Security Bureau (from which the initial official claim that Li died of 'hide and seek' came), the Yunnan Provincial Public Security Bureau concluded Li had been beaten to death by other prisoners. Meanwhile, it was also announced that the vice-director of the Jinning Public Security Bureau and the chief of Jinning County Prison were dismissed; two prison guards were sentenced to jail for the charge of malfeasance (Luo, 2009) .
There are offline factors that need to be considered, which could explain why Chinese citizens chose to question rather than accept official claims. The Internet enables online cooperation but has no default capability of indicating what is suspicious and should be questioned. One alternative explanation might be the public distrustfulness of the Chinese political system, the result of a series of actions of local and regional governments, such as building chemical plants with potential environment damage (Yuan, 2011) , using public funds to construct luxury government building (Xiao, 2011) , land acquisition without reasonable compensation for peasants (Tan, 2012) , and forced house demolition without properly resettling residents (Tian, 2010) . These examples, along with similar others unmentioned here, have made Chinese citizens automatically regard government statements and actions as pursuing political interest rather than public interest. The cases of 'South China Tiger' and 'hide and seek' are based on such a general distrust of government. The application of Internet in these two cases aired and amplified the distrust as well as the embarrassment caused by those official claims, pushing the Shaanxi and Yunnan provincial governments to confess their local departments' deception.
Discussion and conclusion
The four cases elaborated above highlight the internal processes of the target-punishing and factchecking government/official-focused HFSEs. At each stage there is a gathering of information and exposure. Although each does not share the same number of stages a basic sequential structure can be identified. Each starts with a trigger that emerged offline, presenting a certain kind of transgressive behaviour, followed by the revelation of the transgression -this is usually some form of hard evidence, a sound recording, photograph, document -or a questionable statement by an official. This initial revelation might be partial or seen as questionable. This provokes the second phase -a response from Internet users. If the corrupt official is still unnamed the second phase initiates the hunt to identify the culprit; if the official is known it may provoke a trawling for further information. Evidence that might undermine a government claim is sought out. This phase may well vary in time scale but involves frequent requests for information among online community members. The move to the third phase is triggered by the exposure of more contextualizing information, a name, a rank, the names of others involved who know the official, or evidence that contradicts the government official's claim. The case can no longer be ignored by officials; they have to respond. This response might well bring the incident to an end but if justice is not seen to be done it might provoke further opprobrium and calls for justice.
The article has shown that the Internet role in Chinese politics has stretched beyond issues of liberation and the public sphere. HFSEs are being used to hold corrupt officials to account and check out government claims. These developments are driven by a complex series of factors. All HFSEs have a trigger which is key to understanding their motivation. A key trigger of these government/official-focused HFSEs is the ongoing endemic official corruption and low government credibility. The existing regulatory system often fails to identify and/or punish corrupt political officials (He, 2000) , leading to a certain number of government officials' misdeeds going unpunished. According to Pei, on average, 140,000 party officials and members were caught in corruption scandals each year in the 1990s, and 5.6 percentage of these were criminally prosecuted; in 2004, 170,850 party officials and members were implicated, but only 4915 (or 2.9%) were subject to criminal prosecution (2006, p. 5). Corruption is the major (if not the only) concern of the Chinese public with the political system in China; even the new Chinese president Xi Jinping states that the Chinese Communist Party faces a serious problem of corruption that could kill the party and ruin the country if it remains unresolved ('China media ', 2012) . While the culture of official impunity is thriving in China (Pei, 2006) , another major concern is also reflected by HFSE, namely the credibility of official claims, due to the fact that local governments usually put expediency ahead of transparency (Fu, 2012) .
Another key trigger is the lack of alternative means for holding corrupt officials to account or questioning official claims. This is the main reason why Chinese citizens resorted to the Internet to expose and punish government officials' misdoings. The media environment in China, which has not been totally opened up due to strict censorship, is unable to be an alternative channel of exposing in the first place. The cases above show that mass media were involved not at the start but once the story was running. In a non-democratic setting such as China, the strictly censored media environment makes journalists carefully select their topic and they are required to comply with the party line, even though there has been a widespread marketization of the media (Tang & Sampson, 2012, p. 458) . With regard to sensitive political issues, Chinese journalists, when facing restrictions, regard tapping into public opinion expressed on the Internet as a tactic to cater to a wider audience while bypassing potential political danger (de Burgh, 2003; Tong & Sparks, 2009 ). Therefore, we are able to see that the traditional media, although not doing much initial exposure, were actively engaging in the government/official-focused HFSE in terms of mainly reporting and sometimes investigating after the Internet users had set the agenda ahead of journalists. Their involvement actually intensified the public discussion on particular issues and acted as a 'pressure cooker', working with the online population jointly pushing the target to provide redress. HFSE is an online phenomenon but also one that cannot be divorced from the political environment. They need to be seen alongside the offline protests that have occurred in China. The number of protests in China, in urban and rural areas, ranging from rebellion, riot, and demonstration to petition and strike, have been increasing. The issues involved include house demolition, land acquisition, environment protection, labour welfare, policy enforcement, village elections, etc., which all have constituted the main sources of conflict in Chinese offline protests. Moreover, the political environment means that the HFSE has been given a space to target local governments and individual officials but a line seems to be drawn at central government; at least no cases we could find focused on central government. In other words, even though there is strict control in Chinese cyberspace the Internet policy in China is fluid and calculating; the Chinese central government generally lets HFSE exist because it views the Internet as a channel to monitor and discipline its local departments and cadres. Of course if its legitimacy and stability are challenged by an HFSE then its response would be different and it is hard to think that HFSE actors' anonymity could be maintained. Drawing on Andrejevic (2005) one could argue that HFSE participants are little more than 'the eyes and ears' of central government co-opted into the surveillance of local government officials. However, we would argue, based on the HFSE we examined and as far we can tell, HFSEs were not organized by central government and participants were not enlisted in response to a central government call for action. Underlying them is a genuine citizen anger and resentment at the transgression of particular norms by public officials and a desire to bring about some resolution.
The HFSE demonstrates the power of the citizens using the Internet to mobilize and form groups in response to a particular claim or transgression. But the Internet is a necessary but not sufficient condition: the occurrence of HFSE is the result of a combination of online and offline factors, such as the lack of formal channels for holding corrupt officials to account, low government credibility that pushes Chinese citizens to question rather than accept official claims, the strictly censored traditional media making the Internet become an additional and desirable channel to expose in the first place, as well as probably the most basic one, namely the imperfect Chinese political system that has brought about and also failed to deal with official corruption and public distrustfulness. HFSEs' 'being online' characteristic makes the politically focused HFSE difficult for Chinese authority to control (due to online anonymity making the identification of particular person online much more complicated than offline), and its existence is also temporary, which emerges after a specific trigger and then stops once some kind of response has been solicited. Given the growing access to the Internet and the fundamental political challenges China faces HFSE is a phenomenon of online politics that is set to continue.
